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THE MYTH OF TRADE USAGES: A TALK 
Lisa Bernstein * 
INTRODUCTION  
The Uniform Commercial Code,1 the Convention for the International Sale of 
Goods,2 the proposed Common European Sales Law3 and many other sets of com-
mercial laws the world over, direct courts to look to unwritten usages of trade to 
interpret contracts and fill contractual gaps. These laws are built on three core as-
sumptions. First, they assume that unwritten, trade usages exist. Second, they assume 
that in the event of a dispute the existence and content of these usages can be proven 
to a court with reasonable accuracy at a cost the parties consider reasonable from an 
ex-ante perspective. And, third, they assume that merchants want courts to look to 
usages in interpreting contractual language and filling contractual gaps. 
This talk presents highlights from several of my empirical projects that were 
designed to explore the validity of these long-held and deeply rooted assumptions. 4 
Although the evidence that I will share with you casts considerable doubt on these 
assumptions, it is important to emphasize at the outset that the findings may not be 
extensive enough (at least not at the moment) to definitively “disprove” these as-
sumptions in the social-scientific sense of disprove. Nevertheless, in thinking about 
whether the evidence presented is sufficient to prompt a serious reconsideration of 
the role that trade usage plays in commercial-law systems, it is important to keep in 
mind that the policy makers and academics who continue to advocate for looking to 
trade usage in commercial adjudication have put forth little, if any, empirical evi-
dence to suggest that usages exist, that their content can be proven to courts with 
 ________________________  
 * Wilson-Dickenson Professor of Law, and Aaron Director Research Scholar, The University of Chicago 
Law School, and International Research Fellow, Said School of Business, The University of Oxford. This talk is 
based on several of my published research studies, see infra note 4. I would like to thank Roger Ford, Emily Kadens, 
Kate Lindgren, Arlette Slomensky, and participants at the University of Montpellier’s Custom and the Law Work-
shop. 
 1. U.C.C. arts. 1, 2 (Am. Law. Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). 
 2. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 1489 
U.N.T.S 3, 19 I.L.M. 671.  
 3. Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a 
Common European Sales Law /* COM/2011/0635 final - 2011/0284 (COD) */. 
 4. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary 
Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999) [hereinafter Questionable Empirical Basis]; Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in 
a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996) 
[hereinafter Merchant Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 U. Mich L. Rev. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Creating Cooperation]; Lisa 
Bernstein, An (Un)common Frame of Reference: An American Perspective on the Jurisprudence of the CESL, 50 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 169 (2013); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (Gregory Klass et. al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Modern Economy]; Lisa Bernstein, 
Custom in the Courts, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 63 (2015). 
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reasonable accuracy at a reasonable price, or that merchants want courts to look to 
usages in interpreting contracts and filling contractual gaps.  
In the main, those who support looking to usages to resolve disputes, have 
looked to two sources of evidence to support their assertion that usages of trade that 
are generally known across the relevant community of merchants exist. The first 
source of evidence is ad hoc examples like the fact that everyone knows that a 2x4 
piece of wood is not a piece of wood measuring two inches by four inches.5 Yet a 
closer look at the most common examples, reveals either significant disagreement 
about the term’s meaning, or that it was memorialized in a written source.  
The second source of support for the proposition that unwritten usages of trade 
exist, and the one that is invoked the world over, is the story, and I do want to em-
phasize here the word, story, of the so-called Law Merchant of the Middle Ages in 
which unwritten transnational sales-related usages that were widely known among 
merchants were said to have supported long distance trade.6  
Yet over the past decade historians like Emily Kadens of Northwestern and 
Charlie Donahue of Harvard have successfully debunked the myth that transnational 
usages of trade that dealt with core areas of sales law existed in this period.7 Their 
extensive archival research has demonstrated that such usages as existed were either 
highly local in nature, or very vague in form--amounting to little more than a basic 
exhortation to act in good faith.  
As for the assumptions that courts can find the content of usages and that most 
merchants want them to do so when interpreting contracts and filling contractual 
gaps, these too have not been empirically demonstrated by the proponents of usage-
based approaches to commercial law. Moreover, the best available empirical evi-
dence suggests that courts have great difficulty determining the content of usages 
and that merchants have a strong preference for formalist/textualist jurisprudential 
approaches that eschew inquiries into usage and other elements of the contracting 
context. 
It is against this background that I want to share with you some studies I under-
took in the spirit of getting realist about legal realism--that is, to do the kind of work 
that legal realists themselves would have done before drafting the Uniform Commer-
cial Code had they in fact followed the social-scientific approach to law that, led by 
Karl Llewellyn himself, they so forcefully advocated in theory.8 
 ________________________  
 5. See e.g. Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the Ideas 
of Ian MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 775, 787 (1999– 2000). 
 6. For two canonical recitations of the Law Merchant Story see e.g., Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous 
Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989); HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE 
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). 
 7. See Emily Kadens, Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1153 (2012); Emily Kadens, 
The Medieval Law Merchant: The Tyranny of a Construct, 7 J. LEGAL. ANALYSIS 251 (2015); Emily Kadens, Order 
within Law, Variety within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 39 (2004); 
Charles Donahue Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica,  5 CHI. J. 
INT’L LAW 21 (2004). 
 8. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). 
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I.  DO TRADE USAGES EXIST? 
Let’s begin by returning to the first core assumption underlying the law of trade 
usages, namely that unwritten, industry-wide usages of trade that are geographically 
coextensive with the scope of trade exist in merchant communities. 
In an effort to explore the validity of this assumption, I began from the generally 
accepted premise that usages are most likely to arise and endure in situations where 
transactors interact: on a repeat basis, over a long period of time, in relatively similar 
transactions. I then identified and studied four merchant industries--hay, grain and 
feed, textiles, and silk--that were roughly characterized by these conditions in the 
early 20th Century.9  
Each of these industries also created a private legal system to arbitrate disputes 
among its members. And, in an effort to provide a set of rules for their arbitrators to 
apply, each industry’s trade association/s undertook to codify their industry’s un-
written customs and usages into written Trade Rules. If the customs and usages of 
these industries had, in fact, been widely-known and relatively uniform, codifying 
them should have been a quick and straightforward process.10  Yet it was not. The 
rules committees tasked with codification quickly discovered that there was no wide-
spread agreement about either the meaning of industry terms of art or the content of 
supposedly standard trade practices. The codification process took years for most 
industries to complete. The deliberations were fraught with contention. Moreover, 
when industries finally did succeed in producing trading rules, they wound up doing 
so through a quasi-legislative process in which assertions about the content of usages 
were but one of dozens of inputs into the rule making process.  
To get a sense of just how basic and pervasive these disagreements were, it is 
useful to look at the hay industry. As their codification process got under way, it soon 
became clear that there was not even agreement on the meaning of the term “bale” 
of hay. As one transactor explained: 
The large bales of New York and New England means a different 
bale from the large bale in the Western States, and the same is true 
of the small bales. In Chicago at present there is a lack of clear def-
inition of small bales.11 
Moreover, some transactors jumped into the debate claiming that whether or not 
something was a bale was to be determined by its size, while others maintained that 
it was to be determined by its weight. 
In addition, while the UCC looks to usage to determine the meaning of the rea-
sonable time for the taking of an action, the hay industry debates reveal that there 
was also a lack of consensus over the meaning of such terms. For example, when an 
attempt was made to draft a rule relating to when certain freight charges had to be 
 ________________________  
 9. These case studies can be found in Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 4. 
 10. For a discussion of why rent seeking was unlikely to have been a reason for disagreements in this context, 
see Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 4, at 740– 44. 
 11. Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 4, at 721. 
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requested, one transactor proposed a rule requiring them to be requested in a “rea-
sonable time.” This suggestion, however, provoked ridicule and widespread disa-
greement. As one participant opined, “that ‘reasonable time’ business will not tell 
anything. You might as well leave it out.” And, in response to a suggestion that a 
more definite rule be adopted, one transactor proposed “nine months,” another “fif-
teen days,” and still another, “within ten days after the freight bills have been paid.”12  
Indeed, this type of disagreement is not surprising. In the debate over the UCC 
itself, a representative of the Merchants Association of New York opposed including 
the “observance of reasonable commercial standards,” in the duty of good faith, ex-
plaining that: 
The usages, customs and practices of business are far from being 
uniform, and the determination of whether a merchant has con-
formed to reasonable commercial standards would be difficult.13 
The type of terminological disagreements observed in the hay industry were not 
mere artifacts of geographically expanding markets in a temporary state of flux. Sim-
ilar problems and disagreements arose during the codification efforts undertaken by 
the relatively close-knit textile industry, which had been centered on a three-block 
area in lower Manhattan for over thirty years when the codification effort began. The 
textile merchants were unable to achieve a consensus even about the meaning of 
everyday terms like “first quality” and “second quality.”  Consensus was so difficult 
to achieve that different sets of rules were eventually developed for many small in-
dustry segments. Yet even with this high degree of segmentation, many terms and 
practices remained uncodified because agreement could not be reached. After eight-
een years of infighting, the thirty-nine page Worth Street Textile Trading Rules were 
promulgated; yet it was another twenty years before disputes over the meaning of 
key terms of trade, even those defined in the rules, began to abate.  
Similar difficulties in codifying customs were also encountered in the grain in-
dustry, the silk industry, the cotton industry, the lumber industry and many others. 
In the lumber industry, for example, merchants could not even agree on a single 
meaning for the commonly used designation 2x4.14 As noted above, the fact that 
everyone knows that a 2x4 is not two inches by four inches is the most commonly 
mentioned example of an unwritten custom, yet a closer look at the history of the 
2x4 reveals that there was not, in fact, a generally accepted usage-based meaning of 
the term.  
Although it was true many people knew that a 2x4 was not a board measuring 
exactly two inches by four inches, for a very long time there was no agreement on 
what the measurements of a 2x4 actually were. The term had one meaning in the 
 ________________________  
 12. Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 4, at 722. 
 13. Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 4, at 745 (citing Commerce and Industry Association of New 
York, Inc. Memorandum of Task Group of the Special Committee of the Commerce and Industry Association of New 
York, on the Uniform Commercial Code on Article 2, Sales and Article 6, Bulk Transfers, in Study of UCC Memo-
randa 24, 29, reprinted in State of New York, 1 Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1954 at 88–93). 
 14. For a history of the 2x4, see Modern Economy, supra note 4. 
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West and one in the South, one for dry wood and one for wet wood, one at the mill 
and another at the lumber yard, and so on.  
Although the industry tried to achieve nation-wide consensus, they were unable 
to do so. In the end, industry trade associations from across the country joined to-
gether and asked the Government to issue a product standard to resolve the disagree-
ment. In 1964, after extensive consideration, a U.S. Product Standard was adopted. 
Although one might wonder whether these types of disagreements about usage 
are an artifact of a bygone era, a study based on a structured survey of unwritten 
usages in the grain and feed trade conducted in and around Amarillo, Texas in the 
late 1990s suggests that they are not.15 Amarillo is a place where all of the precondi-
tions conducive to the emergence of usages were present, yet transactors simply did 
not agree on the content of usages or the meaning of words.  
For example, although transactors agreed that a price adjustment was often an 
appropriate response to the delivery of non-conforming goods, they differed widely 
as to how exactly the price difference was to be calculated. Some transactors said it 
should be negotiated, while others maintained it should be done on the basis of a 
regional or local price list. Transactors could not even agree on the meaning of the 
terms like FOB or even what the acronym stood for—“when asked . . . 6 percent 
said, they did not know, 2 percent said ‘factory on balance,’ 32 percent said ‘fee on 
board,’ 22 percent said, ‘freight on board,’ 2 percent ‘freight on delivery,’ and 34 
percent responded in different ways.”16 
The study also asked transactors whether there were unwritten usages and prac-
tices they expected their contracting partners to follow. Although 72% said there 
were such usages, not a single transactor was able to give an example. Eventually, 
after additional question probes were used, 65% gave an example, but among their 
answers half were practices that were codified in written industry rules, and most of 
the others were just old-boy rules of thumb like, “Follow the golden rule,” or “My 
word is my bond.”  
Taken together, these studies reveal that even in merchant communities where 
all of the ideal preconditions for the emergence of robust trade usages were present, 
transactors did not agree about the content of trade practices or the meaning of in-
dustry terms of art. Although the studies did reveal a few vague or highly localized 
usages, such as that hay should not have a bad odor, they nonetheless suggest that 
even under these ideal conditions, trade practices did not amount to anything close 
to the all-pervasive sets of implicit gap-filling provisions and dictionary-type inter-
pretive guides assumed by the Uniform Commercial Code and other usage-friendly 
commercial law systems.  
II. CAN COURTS FIND USAGES 
A common response to the findings of the case studies of these merchant indus-
tries is that they must be wrong because transactors prove the content of trade usages 
 ________________________  
 15. For an overview of this study, see Bernstein, Modern Economy, supra note 4, at 246–249. 
 16. Bernstein, Modern Economy, supra note 4, at 57. 
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in court every day, using expert witness testimony, trade codes, and statistical studies 
about the prevalence of transacting practices.17  
This claim, however, turns out to be false. I undertook a study of all the trade 
usage cases digested under the Code’s trade usage provision from 1970 to 2007.18 
For a third of the cases, the study  looked not only at the courts’ opinions but also at 
large portions of the record and evidence submitted. It found that: 
  The introduction of non-party witness testimony was far from being the 
norm. In the cases that went to trial plaintiffs introduced non-party witness testimony 
20.8% of the time and defendants did so 22.9% of the time. Since this group includes 
both expert and all other non-party witnesses, it provides an upper bound for approx-
imating the frequency with which expert witness testimony was introduced.19 
  Even in cases where a trial was held and a trade usage was found to exist, 
expert witness testimony was introduced in at most 31.5% of the cases.20 
  Similarly, trade codes or other trade-association publications were offered 
into evidence in only 11% of cases, and were admitted into evidence in only about 
6%.21 
  Finally-- perhaps most strikingly-- the study did not uncover a single case in 
which statistical evidence was introduced to demonstrate the regularity with which 
a practice was followed.22 Rather, regularity of observance, to the extent it was men-
tioned at all, was typically demonstrated through witness assertions like “yeah that’s 
common” not data or even concrete examples of transactions in which the alleged 
usage was actually followed.23 
Together, these findings raised the question: How, then, do parties attempt to 
prove usages? The answer is that parties introduce far less evidence, and far less 
reliable evidence, then theorists generally assume. More specifically, in practice, the 
most common type of evidence introduced was simply the testimony of the parties 
or their employees. In just over 50% of the cases that went to trial and found a custom 
to exist, this testimony was the only evidence of usage introduced. Similarly, on mo-
tions for summary judgment, non-movants successfully defeated summary judgment 
on the basis of an asserted usage 70% of the time, and in 83% of those cases, the 
 ________________________  
 17. See e.g., Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy,  THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193 (2000). 
 18. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 4. 
 19. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 4. 
 20. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 4, at 79. 
 21. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 4, at 79. 
 22. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 4, at 79–80. 
 23. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 4, at 79–80 and n.64 (“To get a feel for the types of evidence 
that courts accept as fulfilling the statutory requirement that the usage be regularly observed, consider the testimony 
that was actually introduced in Spurgeon v. Jamieson Motors, 521 P.2d 924 (Mont. 1974) where a trial was held and 
the court found the claimed usage to exist. In Spurgeon two of the defendant’s employees testified as to the usage 
of the used farm machinery trade. Ingeman Svendson testified that he had worked with farm machinery for forty 
years. When asked whether it was customary to warrant used combines, he said “no.” That was the extent of his 
testimony on the scope of the usage. Transcript of Record at 41, Spurgeon, 521 P.2d 924 (on file with author). Keith 
Jamieson also testified to Jamieson Motors’ policy of sharing repair costs 50-50 on newer used models and providing 
no additional warranties. He was then asked if this was “pretty much standard throughout the business in your trade.” 
He replied that it was. Id. at 79.”) 
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only evidence of the usage submitted was a cursory affidavit by an employee.24 In-
deed, across the data set as a whole, the evidence of usage introduced by the parties 
was so thin, that I was not able to identify a single alleged usage whose “existence” 
had been in fact demonstrated to exist in the manner and to the extent assumed in the 
literature or expected by the Code’s drafter.  
In sum, this study suggests that even if usages in fact exist, the types of evidence 
of them that parties introduce—typically the testimony of themselves and their em-
ployees—is unlikely to demonstrate their content with the reliability that legal theo-
rists assume. 
III. DO MERCHANTS WANT COURTS TO LOOK TO TRADE USAGE? 
The final assumption underlying the idea that courts should look to trade usages 
to fill gaps and interpret contracts, is that commercial transactors want them to do 
so. However, this assumption also turns out to be highly questionable. 
Some evidence about merchant preferences in this regard can be found in my 
studies of: 
  The trade rules used in industries with trade association-run private legal sys-
tems; and  
  My detailed case studies of the jurisprudence of the merchant staffed arbitra-
tion tribunals in the grain & feed25 and cotton industries.26  
These studies show that even though the arbitration tribunals in these private 
legal systems are staffed by merchant arbitrators who are participants in the relevant 
trade and should thus be up to date on any relevant usages, these tribunals only look 
to usage in the narrowest of circumstances. They do not look to unwritten usages to 
interpret contractual provisions; and only look to usages to fill contractual gaps when 
both the contract and the association’s written trade rules are silent. Even then, they 
do not automatically incorporate usages, but rather look to them as just some evi-
dence of what a good gap-filler might be, with their acceptance turning largely on 
the business justification given for them.  
These findings suggest that merchants do not want adjudicators to look to usage 
to decide cases in any but the narrowest of circumstances. They are consistent with 
other more generalized studies of transactor preferences and contracting choices 
which strongly suggest that business transactors have a strong preference for formal-
istic adjudication. For example, one study found that business transactors prefer rel-
atively textualist/formalist New York law over very contextualist California law.27 
Similarly, a study of choice-of-law clauses in Europe “that looked at choice of law 
provisions in business contracts subject to arbitration at the International Chamber 
 ________________________  
 24. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 4, at 80–81. 
 25. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 4 (providing a case study of the grain and feed industry). 
 26. Bernstein, Creating Cooperation, supra note 4 (providing a case study of the cotton industry). 
 27. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law 
and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009) (looking 
at choice of law clauses in large commercial contracts, though not exclusively ones for the sale of goods). 
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of Commerce. . . found that transactors strongly favored British law, the most for-
malistic of the available EU alternatives.”28 Together this and other evidence29 sug-
gests that commercial contracting parties prefer the meaning of their contracts to be 
governed more by their written meaning than by elements of the contracting context 
or broad standard-like legal formulations requiring that things be done: reasonably, 
seasonably, in good faith or in keeping with the customs and usages of particular 
trades. In American sales law, these terms are given more precise meaning largely 
by reference to trade usages.  
CONCLUSION 
In closing, I want to suggest that even if unwritten usages exist,  are typically 
known by transactors in the relevant markets, and can be proven to courts with rea-
sonable accuracy at a reasonable cost, there are a number of reasons identified by 
myself and fellow neo-formalist scholars Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott30 that 
these considerations should not be taken into account in filling gaps and interpreting 
commercial contracts, at least not in business contracts in the United States.  
Among the most important reasons that courts deciding business-to-business 
commercial cases should not look to usages in adjudicating cases, are that the incor-
poration of usages: 
  May increase specification costs--that is, the cost of contract drafting--as 
transactors strive to fortify their contracts against usage-based interpretation and spe-
cifically negate usages they want to exclude; 
  May increase interpretive error costs, because the evidence that is accepted 
as proving a usage is so thin; 
  May increase the cost of adjudication; 
  May reduce the likelihood that cases can be resolved on motions for summary 
judgment due to the fact specific nature of the usage inquiry; and 
  May encourage various types of strategic behavior. 
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, when the law directs courts to incor-
porate usages into contracts, and in many instances courses of performance and deal-
ing as well, it blurs the line between the legal and nonlegal aspects of parties under-
standings. It therefore prevents parties from structuring their commercial relation-
ships using their preferred mix of: 
  legally enforceable contract provisions backed by legal sanctions, and  
 ________________________  
 28. Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, supra note 4, at 109 (citing Stuart Popham, Clifford Chance LLP, The 
View of European Business: Survey Results, PowerPoint Presentation (Mar. 14, 2008), http://den-
ning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/Popham_-_presentation.PPT). 
 29. Commercial contracts often include provisions opting out of trade usage, see id. at 178 (“See Network 
Engines, Inc. & VA Linux Systems, Inc., Supplier Agreement cl. 20.18 (Mar. 1,2000) (on file with the Northwestern 
University Law Review) (“This Agreement shall not be modified and/or amended by any course of dealing, course 
of performance or trade usage.”); Compaq Computer Corp. & Brocade Communications Systems, Inc., Corporate 
Purchase Agreement cl. 31.6 (Feb. 1, 2000) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (“This Agree-
ment . . . shall not be supplemented or modified by any course of dealing or trade usage. Variance from or addition 
to the terms and conditions of this Agreement in any Order, or other written notification from Seller will be of no 
effect.”).”) 
 30. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 
541 (2003). 
8
Barry Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol23/iss2/5
Spring 2018 The Myth of Trade Usages: A Talk 127 
  Extralegal norms and agreements, backed only by nonlegal sanctions.  
Because legal and nonlegal obligations are often well-suited to governing differ-
ent aspects of commercial agreements, this consideration, even standing alone, sug-
gests that the incorporation of trade usage into commercial agreements may be quite 
costly to business contracting, even if trade usages exist. 
 
9
: The Myth Of Trade Usages: A Talk
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2018
